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I.
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption of the case. Appellant
Catherine Brown was the Plaintiff below. Respondents Chris Glover dba CHICK-FIL-A
of Fashion Place and Hahn Property Management Corporation, a California corporation
dba Hahn Company were the Defendants.
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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(3)(k) and
78-29-3(2)(j). The Order granting summary judgment was entered on July 23, 1997
(R.449-451). Appellant's timely notice of appeal was filed on August 6, 1997 (R.455456).
V.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are:
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs Motion
to Continue Trial and Vacate Scheduling Order given the exigent
circumstances (R.449-451; A. 1-3).

2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not granting Plaintiffs
Motion to Compel, given that Defendant had previously agreed to provide
discovery responses, prior to ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment
(R.449-451; A. 1-3).

3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Plaintiffs
discovery requests could have been done well before the Summary
1

Judgment Motion was filed, given the exigent circumstances (R.449-451;
A.1-3).
4.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Summary Judgment
as a sanction against Plaintiff when it was Defendant that failed to respond
to discovery (R.449-451; A. 1-3).

5.

Whether the trial court abuse its discretion by not granting Plaintiffs
Motion for Continuance [of the hearing on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgement] Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(f) (R.449451; A.1-3).

6.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment (R.449-451; A. 1-3).

As to issues number 1 - 5 , the applicable standard of appellate review is abusive
discretion in the trial court's decision to deny the Motion to Continue, Motion to Compel
and Rule 56(f) motion. Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 298 (Utah
App. 1994); Crossland Savings v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1242 (Utah 1994).
As to issue no. 6, the applicable standard of appellate review is a review for
correctness, with no deference to the conclusions of the trial court. See: Anderson v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 577-78 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 929

2

P.2d 350 (Utah 1996); Mitchell v. Rice, 885 P.2d 820, 821 (Utah App. 1994); Schurtz
v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1991); and Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(c).
VI.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Rules 40(b) and 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are determinative in this
case. Rule 40(b) provides:
ASSIGNMENT OF CASES FOR TRIAL; CONTINUANCE
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the court may in its
discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon
good cause shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to
procure it.
Rule 56(f) provides:
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as
is just.

3

VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition of the Lower Court.
This case involves a slip and fall accident which occurred on January 18, 1994 at

Fashion Place Mall near the CHICK-FIL-A restaurant.

Plaintiff was a Dillard's

employee that had been visiting another shop during her lunch hour. On her way back
from lunch, Plaintiff walked down the mall concourse where the CHICK-FIL-A
restaurant was located.

An unidentified CHICK-FIL-A employee was in the mall

concourse offering mall patrons samples of greasy chicken on a tooth-pick.

As she

walked past the CHICK-FIL-A restaurant, Plaintiff slipped and fell on a greasy piece of
chicken.

Plaintiff sustained serious injuries to her back from the slip and fall.

(Complaint and Jury Demand, R.2-3; Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, R. 12-13;
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 177-178).
On May 5, 1997 the Court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs Motion to Continue
Trial and Vacate Scheduling Order, Motion to Compel, Rule 56(f) Motion to Stay
Decision and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. At the conclusion, the Court
denied Plaintiffs Motion to Stay, granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
and found that Plaintiffs Motion to Continue Trial and Vacate the Scheduling Order was
4

moot. No decision was made on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel.
B.

Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review,
Defendant CHICK-FIL-A was served with a Complaint and Plaintiffs First Set of

Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on October 19, 1995
(Certificate of Service, R. 19-21). The Interrogatories consisted of five (5) questions
seeking the name, address, telephone number, and identity of CHICK-FIL-A employees,
specifically the employee distributing samples in the mall on January 18, 1994.
Defendant agreed to provide discovery responses. On April 3, 1996 Plaintiffs attorney
again requested the names of those individuals working at the CHICK-FIL-A restaurant
on January 18, 1994 (Memo, in Support of Motion to Compel, Ex. C, R.244). In June
1996, Plaintiffs case was transferred within the DeBry firm to Mr. Wells (R.88). On
December 9, 1996, Ed Wells withdrew as Plaintiffs counsel of record, and was
subsequently disbarred (R.110). On December 3, 1996, Plaintiffs subsequent attorney
again advised Defendant's attorney that Defendant's answers were late (Memo, in Support
of Motion to Compel, Ex. D, R.246). Defendant did not answer Plaintiffs First Set of
Interrogatories until March 24, 1997 (Defendant Chris Glover dba CHICK-FIL-A's
Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories, R. 168-171). The answers filed were
incomplete and non-responsive.

On March 31, 1997 Defendant filed its Motion and
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Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 176-219). On April 14,
1997 Plaintiff filed her Motion and Memorandum to Compel Defendant's Answers to
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories; Motion and Memorandum to Continue Trial and
to Vacate Scheduling Order (R.232-252; 301-324; 325-327); and noticed up 27
depositions of the employees identified in Defendant's answers to interrogatories (R.220227; 232-298) On April 21, 1997 Plaintiff filed Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion to Stay
Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Until Additional Discovery is
Complete; Affidavit of Nancy A. Mismash; and Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Continuance Under Rule 56(f) (R.330-331; 332-390; 391-393).
Plaintiff moved for a continuance of the trial date because Defendant failed to
provide the discovery as agreed and because of exigent circumstances (R.304-307).
Specifically, this case was transferred internally within the DeBry firm from George
Waddoups to Mr. Wells to lessen the caseload of Mr. Waddoups because Mr. Waddoups'
son had been diagnosed with cancer and was beginning cancer treatment (Transcript p.
10).

Subsequently, Mr. Wells encountered difficulty with the Utah State Bar on an

unrelated matter and was disbarred.

The file was temporarily transferred to Dan

Torrence, who was at the DeBry firm 1-2 months. The file was then transferred to Al
6

Gray while a new attorney was hired to help with Mr. Wells' caseload. Nancy Mismash
appeared as counsel on March 26, 1997, five (5) days before the Motion for Summary
Judgment was filed (R. 174-175). Because of Mr. Waddoups' familiarity with this case,
he resumed an active role in the case on or about April 9, 1997 (R.304-307). At the time
of the hearing to continue the case, Mr. Waddoups had a trial scheduled for the same
dates as the Brown trial (R.304-307).

vra.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment in this case.
Prior to the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiff filed a
motion for continuance. The motion established a good cause basis to continue the trial.
Despite this good cause, the trial court denied Plaintiffs motion to continue and granted
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In so doing, it abused its discretion.
Simultaneously with the motion to continue, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel
seeking answers to outstanding discovery. The trial court erroneously found that Plaintiff
should have moved to compel discovery prior to Defendant filing for summary judgment.
The court allowed Defendant to benefit from its abuse of the discovery process by
granting its motion for summary judgment in light of the outstanding discovery. This
7

amounted to an abuse of discretion. In addition, the court denied Plaintiffs Rule 56(f)
motion to continue using the same analysis.
Finally, the court committed reversible error by granting summary judgment in
light of the outstanding discovery. By so doing, the court precluded Plaintiff from fully
investigating her case and marshalling all the evidence necessary to oppose summary
judgment.
IX.
ARGUMENT
A.

As a Matter of Law The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance,
On April 14, 1997 ~ six (6) weeks before the trial was scheduled to start ~

Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the trial be continued. Plaintiff identified the
following reasons for her request:

1) Defendant CHICK-FIL-A failed and refused to

provide discover responses1; 2) Because Plaintiff did not have Defendant's discovery
responses she was unable to fully investigate her claims;

3) Plaintiffs counsel was

unexpectedly forced to withdraw from the case and was subsequently disbarred; and 4)

*In addition to the Motion to Continue Trial and Vacate Scheduling Order, Plaintiff
also filed a Motion to Compel Discovery seeking answers to her first set of
interrogatories.
8

replacement counsel had a trial scheduled to begin on the same day as the trial in this
case. Based on these reasons, the Court should have continued the trial as a matter of
law.
Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its discretion, and upon such
terms as may be just . . . postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. (Emphasis added).
In Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977) the defendant's counsel was
unable to appear before the court on the scheduled trial date because of a previously
scheduled court appearance. As such, defendant's counsel filed an objection seeking to
have the trial date continued. The objection was never ruled on and the defendant did
not appear for trial. The trial court entered a default judgment against defendant. The
Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded holding, "when counsel has made timely
objections, given necessary notice, and has made a reasonable effort to have the trial date
changed . . . it [is] an abuse of discretion not to grant a continuance." Id. at 376. See
also: Baeras v. Johnson, 373 P.2d 375, 377 (Utah 1962) (despite two prior continuances,
the trial court abused it discretion by denying the request for an additional continuance
so the Plaintiff could be present at the trial).
Plaintiff herein made the necessary "good cause" showing to justify continuation
9

of the trial. She advised the trial court about the delays with discovery and her efforts
to obtain the information from Defendant (R.301-303; Transcript pp. 7-9). Plaintiff also
advised the Court that her attorney, Mr. Wells, was forced to withdraw and, because of
his disbarment, was prevented from further representing or assisting her with this case.
This unexpected change warranted additional time for replacement counsel to become
fully advised of the case. Plaintiffs replacement counsel timely notified the Court of his
inability to appear for trial on the scheduled dates due to a conflicting trial schedule
(Transcript pp. 7, 10-11). These combined facts constitute "good cause" for continuation
of the trial. As such, the trial court abused its discretion by not ruling on the motion for
continuance prior to ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment.
B.

As a Matter of Law the Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Rendering a
Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff propounded interrogatories to Defendant on October 19, 1995 (R. 19-21).

Defendant answered these interrogatories on March 24, 1997 (R. 168-173). The answers
filed were incomplete and not responsive (R.238-234). One week later, on March 31,
1997, Defendant filed for summary judgment (R.218-219). In response, Plaintiff filed
a Motion to Continue; Motion to Compel; Notices of Deposition; Rule 56(b) Motion to
Stay; Affidavit of Nancy A. Mismash; and Memorandum in Opposition.

Despite

Plaintiffs outstanding motions, the trial court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary
10

Judgment.

As a matter of law, the trial court abused its discretion by rendering a

decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in light of the pending motions.
Defendant had thirty (30) days to respond to Plaintiffs interrogatories. Rule 31,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In lieu of a response Defendant could have requested
additional time to respond or sought a protective order. Rule 26(c), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Defendant did nothing. Upon inquiry from Plaintiff, Defendant agreed to
provide the requested information.

Again, Defendant did nothing. When Defendant

finally responded to Plaintiffs interrogatories, the answers provided were incomplete and
non-responsive. As such, Defendant did not meet its duty to respond to discovery.
At the hearing before the trial court, Defendant erroneously argued, and the trial
court erroneously found, that Plaintiff had the duty to compel discovery from Defendant
when answers were not received. Plaintiff argued that at no time was she advised that
Defendant would not answer the interrogatories and, that if she had been so advised, she
would have moved to compel. Within a few weeks of receiving Defendant's answers,
Plaintiff filed a motion to compel seeking complete answers to her interrogatories.
Despite this pending motion2, the Court proceeded to grant summary judgment in
2

Plaintiff s Motion to Compel was scheduled for hearing on May 5, 1997, the same
date and time as Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R.402-403; Transcript p.
52).
11

favor of Defendant holding, "the discovery requested could have been done well before
the summary judgment motion was filed if Plaintiff had utilized the available discovery
procedures." (R.450). This holding effectively sanctioned Plaintiff for failing to compel
discovery earlier and rewarded Defendant for its misuse of this discovery process. This
holding constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.
In W.W. & W.B. Gardner v. Park West Village, 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977) the
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment against the
defendant for defendant's failure to respond to discovery.

The defendant appealed,

arguing, as Defendant herein argued, that "plaintiff cannot complain, since plaintiff did
not move pursuant to Rule 37[(a)(2)] for an order compelling defendant to answer
interrogatories." Id. at 738. The Gardner court rejected this argument and held:
Defendant may not ignore with impunity the requirements of
Rules 33 and 34, and the necessity to respond within thirty
(30) days, or to request additional time or to seek a protective
order under Rule 26(c). A party to an action has a right to
have the benefits of discovery procedure promptly, not only
in order that he may prepare his case, but also in order to
bring light to facts which may entitle him to summary
judgment.
Id. at 738.
Further, it is well settled that summary judgment should not be granted if

12

discovery is incomplete since information sought in discovery may create genuine issues
of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740
P.2d 275, 277 (Utah App. 1987) citing Auerbach 's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 377
(Utah 1977).
In Auerbach*s defendant moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs counterclaim. At the time of the summary judgment hearing defendant had not responded to
plaintiffs discovery and plaintiff timely filed a motion to strike the hearing because of
this deficiency.
motion.

The trial court proceeded with the hearing and granted defendant's

Plaintiff appealed.

In reversing the trial court, the Utah Supreme court

reasoned:
The granting of the motion for summary judgment was
premature because [plaintiffs] discovery was not then
complete. It was the information sought in the proceedings
for discovery, which [plaintiff] claimed would infuse the issue
with facts sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment, and sustain his counter-claim.
Id. at 377
The court went on to hold:
When a motion is made opposing summary judgment on the
grounds discovery has not been completed, the court should
grant a continuance or deny the motion for summary
judgment. (Emphasis added).
13

Id. at 377
In this case, Plaintiff received Defendant's answers to interrogatories one week
before receiving Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Upon receipt of

Defendant's answers Plaintiff learned, for the first time, that Defendant was not going to
provide the names, addresses, telephone numbers, etc. of the CHICK-FIL-A employees
despite Defendant's previous representations that this information would be provided.
Plaintiff timely filed a Motion to Compel and responded to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment with a memorandum in opposition and Rule 56(f) affidavit requesting
additional discovery. Plaintiff also noticed a deposition for each employee identified.
Said depositions were scheduled to occur before the trial date.
Defendant's delay in answering interrogatories prevented Plaintiff from fulling
investigation her claim and ultimately precluded the discovery of facts and witness
material to the opposition of summary judgment and to Plaintiffs presentation of her
case.

And, it was not only Plaintiffs interrogatories that were ignored by Defendant.

Defendant further frustrated the discovery process by its failure to fully respond to the
trial court's scheduling order (Transcript p. 11). Specifically, Defendant did not identify
its witnesses with particularity but rather identified them generically i.e., Hahn Property
Personnel, Fashion Place Mall security personnel, and CHICK-FIL-A personnel (R.13614

137) thereby denying Plaintiff of the names and identity of fact witnesses necessary to
support her claims.
The trial court got things backwards.

It should have focused its attention on

Defendant's inactions and asked what Defendant had done to comply with the rules rather
than what Plaintiff had done.

Further, the trial court should not have allowed

Defendant's failure to comply with discovery to be used to Defendant's advantage in
support of its Motion For Summary Judgment. Under these facts, the trial court should
have deferred the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment until discovery
was complete. As such, the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the Plaintiff
"could have" compelled Defendant's answers earlier and thereafter ruling on Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
C.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Denying Plaintiffs Rule 56(f)
Motion to Continue.
As is argued above, Plaintiff timely commenced discovery in this case.

Her

discovery efforts were severely frustrated by Defendant's failure to timely produce
answers. Upon receipt of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff timely
filed her opposition along with a Rule 56(f) motion to continue and supporting affidavit
(R.393-396). This affidavit sets forth the specific facts Plaintiff expected to discover.

15

These facts were the exclusive control of Defendant and were material to Plaintiffs
theory of the case. As such, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs
Rule 56(f) motion to continue.
In Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984) the Utah Supreme Court set forth
the criteria for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f). The first consideration is was there
sufficient discovery prior to the motion for summary judgment and, if so, was it afforded
an appropriate response. Id. at 313. And, second, was the discovery sought by the party
opposing summary judgment for purely speculative facts after substantial discovery. Id.
at 314. See also: Downtown Athletic Club at 278.
In Cox the court found that plaintiff had commenced discovery prior to the filing
of the motion for summary judgment and that these efforts were "precluded by reason of
defendant's failure to respond."

Id. at 314.

They also found that the outstanding

discovery dealt with the very issues raised in the motion for summary judgment. As such
the court reversed the trial courts grant of summary judgment.
Cox is squarely on point with the facts presented in this case. Specifically, one of
plaintiffs theories of recovery was that by distributing greasy chicken in a busy mall
concourse, defendant engaged in a method of operation whereby the foreseeable acts of
third parties, i.e. dropping chicken on the floor created a dangerous condition. (R.13)
16

In order to advance this theory, Plaintiff needed to talk with the employees of CHICKFIL-A and learn:
a.

The skill of the employees serving the chicken;

b.

The policies and procedures actually in place for handing out chicken
samples;

c.

The method for handing out chicken samples, specifically: how often the
servers went over the lease line into the mall common area; how often the
area was cleaned; how far into the mall the cleaning extended; how the
chicken was prepared; how large the pieces were cut; how often chicken
was dropped on the floor; who was served chicken;

d.

The substance of the lease agreement between Defendant Hahn and
Defendant CHICK-FIL-A;

e.

Whether warnings were issued from Defendant Hahn to Defendant CHICKFIL-A regarding Defendant Chick-Fil-A's activity within the mall common
area;

f.

Defendant Hahn Management's responsibilities for the care and upkeep of
the mall common area, including any cleaning records;

g.

The sum and substance of any discussions between Defendant Hahn and
17

Defendant CHICK-FIL-A regarding Plaintiff and the accident in question;
and,
h.

The sum and substance of any accident reports for the years 1990 through
present.

Affidavit of Nancy A. Mismash (R.393-396).
Because Defendant did not comply with Plaintiffs discovery request as set forth
above, Plaintiff was unable to fully investigate this claim and, plaintiff was ultimately
unable to present the trial court with the facts necessary to withstand summary judgment.
Accordingly Plaintiff timely filed for her Rule 56(f) motion to continue along with a
supporting affidavit setting forth the additional discovery sought.
Given that Defendant had already failed to comply with discovery, the trial Court
abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion to allow further discovery
before ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
D.

Utah Case Law Requires That Discovery be Completed Before Summary
Judgment Can be Rendered.
In opposing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff presented the

trial court with a number of issues of material fact that would have precluded summary
judgment: i.e., how far away from the CHICK-FIL-A restaurant was Plaintiff when she

18

fell; what caused her to fall; did the employees of CHICK-FIL-A negligently distribute
chicken samples in the mall walkway; did CHICK-FIL-A knowingly create a danger by
offering chicken samples when the mall was crowded; did CHICK-FIL-A anticipate
pieces of chicken and toothpicks might be dropped or thrown on the floor in the mall
walkway; did CHICK-FIL-A receive complaints about their sampling practice, and if so,
what action was taken. The trial court erroneously concluded that the claims presented
by Plaintiff were no different that those denied as a matter of law in Schnuphase v.
Storehouse Markets, 918 P. 2d 476 (Utah 1996) and granted Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
It is well recognized that issues of negligence ordinarily present questions of fact
to be resolved by the fact-finder. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d
1332 (Utah 1979). Summary judgement in negligence actions is only appropriate in the
most clear cut cases. Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 12 (Utah 1987).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated its position on the importance of trial by jury.
In Webb v. Olin Mathison, 342 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1959), the court held:
. . . It is the declared policy of this court to zealously protect the right of
trial by jury and not to take issues from them and rule as a matter of law
except in clear cases.
The Utah Supreme Court has also set forth the following standard to be applied
19

in evaluating a motion for summary judgement:
Summary judgement is proper only if the pleadings, deposition, affidavits
and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. If there is any
doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the opposing party. Thus, the court must evaluate all
the evidence and all the reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the
evidence in a light favorable to the party opposing summary judgement.
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 436 (Utah 1982).
The Supreme Court has characterized summary judgment as a "harsh measure" and
requires that the contentions of the party opposing summary judgement be considered in
a light most advantageous to them with all doubts resolved in favor of permitting trial.
W. W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Mann, 680 P.2d 23, 24 (Utah 1984). In applying these
standards for summary judgment, all of the evidence, inferences, and implications must
be given to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all the benefits
must be resolved in the non-moving party's favor.
The pinnacle argument presented to the trial court was whether or not Defendant's
method of operation, i.e. offering samples of greasy chicken in the mall concourse,
created a dangerous condition such that Plaintiff need not prove actual or constructive
notice of the condition (R.342; Transcript p. 44-45). Specifically, Plaintiff argued that
the activities of Defendant in this case were more akin the activities of the defendant in
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Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P. 2d 1224 (Utah App. 1996) than those of the defendant in
Schnuphase (R.342). In order to advance this theory, Plaintiff needed to talk with the
CHICK-FIL-A employees that actually distributed the chicken to the mall patrons.
Plaintiff was precluded from furthering this theory because of Defendant's failure and
refusal to fully cooperate in discovery as argued above.
In a recent Utah case, Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P. 2d 678 (Utah 1997),
the Supreme Court reversed the trail court's grant of summary judgment. The Drysdale
court held:
Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court before judgment can
be rendered against them . . . prior to the completion of discover, however, it is
often difficult to ascertain whether the non-moving party will be able to sustain its
claim. In such case, summary judgment should generally be denied. (Emphasis
added).
Id. at 680.
As in Drysdale, Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to complete discovery.
Specifically, she was precluded from establishing that the method of operation used by
Defendant created a dangerous condition. Because Plaintiff was denied this opportunity
to fully present her case, summary judgement was improper and should be reversed as
a matter of law.
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X.
CONCLUSION
In this case, had Defendant provided Plaintiff with answers to interrogatories
Plaintiff would have been able to fully investigate her claims and oppose the motion for
summary judgment. Given the outstanding discovery, the trial court abused its discretion
by granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment without considering any of
Plaintiffs pending motions.
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of Defendant's discovery responses, Plaintiff
presented the trial court with disputed issues of material fact, as well as a viable theory
of recovery. Given the general preference to have negligence cases go before a jury, the
trial court committed reversible error by granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Plaintiff requests that this case be reversed and remanded so that she may present
her case to the trier of fact.
DATED this V

day of July, 1998.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant

By:UMiSft
NANCY A. MISMASH
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHERINE BROWN,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

vs.
CHRIS GLOVER, d/b/a CHICK-FIL-A,
INC. of FASHION PLACE, HAHN
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a California corporation
d/b/a HAHN COMPANY,

Civil No. 950905823 PI
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on May 5, 1997. Plaintiff wasj)resent and
represented by Mr. George T. Waddoups and Ms. Nancy A. Mismash of Robert J. DeBry &
Associates. Defendants were represented by Mr. John R Lund and Mr. Scott K. Wilson of
Snow, Christensen & Martineau. Arguments were presented regarding the following motions, all
of which had been fully briefed prior to the hearing:
1.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

2.

Plaintiffs Motion to Continue Trial and Vacate Scheduling Order

3.

Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion to Stay Decision

The court now being fully advised, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the
following judgment and order:
1.

Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion to Stay Decision is denied, for the reasons and on the

grounds set forth in the record, including that the discovery requested could have been done well
before the summary judgment motion was filed, if plaintiff had utilized the available discovery
procedures, and that the information sought is not material to grounds for defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.
2.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for the reasons and on the

grounds set forth in the record, including the absence of any meaningful distinction between the
claims presented in this case and the claims that were denied as a matter of law in Schnuphase v.
Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996), Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360
(Utah 1973), md Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975).
3.

Plaintiffs Motion to Continue Trial and Vacate Scheduling Order is deemed moot

by the Court's granting of summary judgment and it is therefore not decided.
4.

Judgment is entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff and plaintiffs

action is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this £ u

day of

\S\xXsAr

, 1997.

William B. Bohling, District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES

By
George T. Waddoups
Nancy A. Mismash
N \11359\43\SUMJUDG ORD

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VI. TRIALS
RULE 40. ASSIGNMENT OF CASES FOR TRIAL; CONTINUANCE
(a) Order and Precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for the
placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties or (2)
upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner
as the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to actions entitled
thereto by statute.
(b) Postponement of the Trial. Upon motion of a party, the court may in
its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of costs
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good
cause shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of evidence,
such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence expected to be
obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to procure it. The court
may also require the party seeking the continuance to state, upon affidavit or
under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon
admits that such evidence would be given, and that it may be considered as
actually given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the trial shall not
be postponed upon that ground.
(c) Taking Testimony of Witnesses Present. If required by the adverse
party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have the
testimony of any witness present taken, in the same manner as if at the trial; and
the testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same effect, and subject
to the same objections that may be made with respect to a deposition under the
provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B) ].
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
ma\ be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as
to the amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial
is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings
and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy,
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just.
Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
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(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to
be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.

(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith
order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be
adjudged guilty of contempt.
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